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Abstract
Adversarial examples expose the vulnerabil-
ities of natural language processing (NLP)
models, and can be used to evaluate and im-
prove their robustness. Existing techniques
of generating such examples are typically
driven by local heuristic rules that are ag-
nostic to the context, often resulting in un-
natural and ungrammatical outputs. This
paper presents CLARE, a ContextuaLized
AdversaRial Example generation model that
produces fluent and grammatical outputs
through a mask-then-infill procedure. CLARE
builds on a pre-trained masked language
model and modifies the inputs in a context-
aware manner. We propose three contex-
tualized perturbations, Replace, Insert and
Merge, allowing for generating outputs of var-
ied lengths. With a richer range of avail-
able strategies, CLARE is able to attack a
victim model more efficiently with fewer ed-
its. Extensive experiments and human evalua-
tion demonstrate that CLARE outperforms the
baselines in terms of attack success rate, tex-
tual similarity, fluency and grammaticality.
1 Introduction
Adversarial example generation for natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) tasks aims to perturb input
text to trigger errors in machine learning models,
while keeping the output close to the original. Be-
sides exposing system vulnerabilities and helping
improve their robustness and security (Zhao et al.,
2018; Wallace et al., 2019; Cheng et al., 2019; Jia
et al., 2019, inter alia), adversarial examples are
also used to analyze and interpret the models’ deci-
sions (Jia and Liang, 2017; Ribeiro et al., 2018).
Generating adversarial examples for NLP tasks
can be challenging, in part due to the discrete na-
ture of natural language text. Recent efforts have
explored heuristic rules, such as replacing tokens
with their synonyms (Samanta and Mehta, 2017;
Super ant colony hits
Australia {Coast, , }.
A {gigantic, , } 100km
colony of ants could threaten
{insect, , } species.
Super ant colony hits
Australia . 
A giant 100km
colony of ants could threaten
local insect species.
CLARE: 
Contextualized
Perturbation
Original Text
Adversarial Text
Figure 1: Illustration of CLARE. Through a mask-then-
infill procedure, the model generates the adversarial
text with three contextualized perturbations: Replace,
Insert and Merge. A mask is indicated by “ ”. The
degree of fade corresponds to the (decreasing) priority
of the infill tokens.
Liang et al., 2019; Alzantot et al., 2018; Ren et al.,
2019; Jin et al., 2020, inter alia). Despite some
empirical success, rule-based methods are agnostic
to context, limiting their ability to produce natu-
ral, fluent, and grammatical outputs (Wang et al.,
2019c; Morris et al., 2020; Kurita et al., 2020, inter
alia).
This work presents CLARE, a ContextuaLized
AdversaRial Example generation model for text.
CLARE perturbs the input with a mask-then-infill
procedure: it first detects the vulnerabilities of a
model and deploys masks to the inputs to indi-
cate missing text, then fills in an alternative token
using a pretrained masked language model (e.g.,
RoBERTa; Liu et al., 2019). CLARE features three
contextualized perturbing actions: Replace, Insert
and Merge, which respectively replace a token, in-
sert a new token, and merge a bigram (Figure 1). As
a result, it can generate outputs of varied lengths,
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in contrast to token replacement based methods
that only produce outputs of the same lengths as
the inputs (Alzantot et al., 2018; Ren et al., 2019;
Jin et al., 2020). Further, CLARE searches over a
wider range of attack strategies, and is thus able
to attack the victim model more efficiently with
fewer edits. Building on a masked language model,
CLARE maximally preserves textual similarity, flu-
ency, and grammaticality of the outputs.
We evaluate CLARE on text classification, nat-
ural language inference, and sentence paraphrase
tasks, by attacking finetuned BERT models (Devlin
et al., 2019). Extensive experiments and human
evaluation show that CLARE outperforms base-
lines in terms of attack success rate, textual similar-
ity, fluency, and grammaticality, and strikes a better
balance between attack success rate and preserv-
ing input-output similarity. Our analysis further
suggests that the CLARE can be used to improve
the robustness of the downstream models, and im-
prove their accuracy when the available training
data is limited. We release our code and models at
https://github.com/cookielee77/CLARE.
2 CLARE
At a high level, CLARE applies a sequence of
contextualized perturbation actions to the input.
Each can be seen as a local mask-then-infill proce-
dure: it first applies a mask to the input around a
given position, and then fills it in using a pretrained
masked language model (§2.1). To produce the
output, CLARE scores and descendingly ranks the
actions, which are then iteratively applied to the
input (§2.2). We begin with a brief background
review and laying out of necessary notation.
Background. Adversarial example generation
centers around a victim model f , which we as-
sume is a text classifier. We focus on the black-box
setting, allowing access to f ’s outputs but not its
configurations such as parameters. Given an input
sequence x = x1x2 . . . xn and its label y, assume
f(x) = y, an adversarial example x′ is supposed
to modify x to trigger an error in the victim model:
f(x′) 6= f(x). At the same time, textual modifica-
tions should be minimal, such that x′ is close to x
and the human predictions on x′ stay the same.1
1 In computer vision applications, minor perturbations to
continuous pixels can be barely perceptible to humans, thus it
can be hard for one to distinguish x and x′ (Goodfellow et al.,
2015). It is not the case for text, however, since changes to the
discrete tokens are more likely to be noticed by humans.
This is achieved by requiring the similarity be-
tween x′ and x to be larger than a threshold:
sim(x′,x) > `. A common choice of sim(·, ·)
is to encode sentences using neural networks, and
calculate their cosine similarity in the embedding
space (Jin et al., 2020).
2.1 Masking and Contextualized Infilling
At a given position of the input sequence, CLARE
can execute three perturbation actions: Replace,
Insert, and Merge, which we introduce in this sec-
tion. These apply masks at the given position with
different strategies, and then fill in the missing text
based on the unmasked context.
Replace: A Replace action substitutes the token
at a given position i with an alternative (e.g., chang-
ing “fantastic” to “amazing” in “The movie is fan-
tastic.”). It first replaces xi with a mask, and then
selects a token z from a candidate set Z to fill in:
x˜ = x1 . . . xi−1 [MASK] xi+1 . . . xn,
replace (x, i) = x1 . . . xi−1 z xi+1 . . . xn.
For clarity, we denote replace (x, i) by x˜z . To
produce an adversarial example,
• z should fit into the unmasked context;
• x˜z should be similar to x;
• x˜z should trigger an error in f .
These can be achieved by selecting a z such that
• z receives a high probability from a masked
language model: pMLM(z | x˜) > k;
• x˜z is similar to x: sim(x, x˜z) > `;
• f predicts low probability for the gold label
given x˜z , i.e., pf (y | x˜z) is small.
pMLM denotes a pretrained masked language model
(e.g., RoBERTa; Liu et al., 2019). Using higher k,
` thresholds produces outputs that are more fluent
and closer to the original. However, this can under-
mine the success rate of the attack. We choose k, `
to trade-off between these two aspects. 2
The first two requirements can be met by the
construction of the candidate set: Z ={
z′ ∈ V | pMLM(z′ | x˜) > k, sim(x, x˜z′) > `
}
.
V is the vocabulary of the masked language model.
To meet the third, we select from Z the token that,
2 k and ` are empirically set as 5 × 10−3 and 0.7, re-
spectively. This also reduces the computation overhead: in
our experiments |Z| is 42 on average, much smaller than the
vocabulary size (|V| = 50, 265).
if filled in, will cause most “confusion” to f :
z = argmin
z′∈Z
pf (y | x˜z′).
The Insert and Merge actions differ from Re-
place in terms of masking strategies. The alter-
native token z is selected analogously to that in a
Replace action.
Insert: This aims to add extra information to the
input (e.g., changing “I recommend ...” to “I highly
recommend ...”). It inserts a mask after xi and then
fills it. Slightly overloading the notations,
x˜ = x1 . . . xi [MASK] xi+1 . . . xn,
insert (x, i) = x1 . . . xi z xi+1 . . . xn.
This increases the sequence length by 1.
Merge: This masks out a bigram xixi+1 with a
single mask and then fills it, reducing the sequence
length by 1:
x˜ = x1 . . . xi−1 [MASK] xi+2 . . . xn,
merge (x, i) = x1 . . . xi−1 z xi+2 . . . xn.
z can be the same as one of the masked tokens (e.g.,
masking out “New York” and then filling in“York”).
This can be seen as deleting a token from the input.
For Insert and Merge, z is chosen in the same
manner as replace action. 3
In sum, at each position i of an input sequence,
CLARE first: (1) replaces xi with a mask; (2) or
inserts a mask after xi; (3) or merges xixi+1 into a
mask. Then a set of candidate tokens is constructed
with a masked language model and a textual similar-
ity function; the token minimizing the gold label’s
probability is chosen as the alternative token.
CLARE first constructs the local actions for all
positions in parallel, i.e., the actions at position i do
not affect those at other positions. Then, to produce
the adversarial example, CLARE gathers the local
actions and selects an order to execute them.
2.2 Sequentially Applying the Perturbations
Given an input pair (x, y), let n denote the length
of x. CLARE chooses from 3n actions to produce
the output: 3 actions for each position, assuming
the candidate token sets are not empty. We aim
to generate an adversarial example with minimum
modifications to the input. To achieve this, we
3 A perturbation will not be considered if its candidate
token set is empty.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Attack by CLARE
1: Input: Text-label pair (x, y); Victim model f
2: Output: An adversarial example
3: Initialization: x(0) = x
4: A ← ∅
5: for 1 ≤ i ≤ |x| do
6: a← highest-scoring action from {
replace(x, i), insert(x, i),merge(x, i)}
7: A ← A⋃{a}
8: end for
9: for 1 ≤ t ≤ T do
10: a← highest-scoring action from A
11: A ← A \ {a}
12: x(t) ← Apply a on x(t−1)
13: if f(x(t))6=y then return x(t)
14: end if
15: end for
16: return NONE
iteratively apply the actions, and first select those
minimizing the probability of outputting the gold
label y from f .
Each action is associated with a score, measuring
how likely it can “confuse” f : denote by a(x) the
output of applying action a to x. The score is then
the negative probability of predicting the gold label
from f , using a(x) as the input:
s(x,y)(a) = −pf
(
y | a(x)).
Only one of the three actions can be applied at each
position, and we select the one with the highest
score. This constraint aims to avoid multiple mod-
ifications around the same position, e.g., merging
“New York” into “Seattle” and then replacing it
with “Boston”.4
Actions are iteratively applied to the input, until
an adversarial example is found or a limit of actions
T is reached. Each step selects the highest-scoring
action from the remaining ones. Algorithm 1 sum-
marizes the above procedure.5
Discussion. A key technique of CLARE is the
local mask-then-infill perturbation. This comes
with several advantages. First, it allows attack-
ing any position of the input sequence, whereas
4 Multiple actions at the same position can be replaced by
one. In preliminary experiments, we found that constraining
one action per position yields better performance in terms of
fluency and grammaticality.
5 Insert and Merge actions change the text length. When
any of them is applied, we accordingly change the text indices
of affected actions remaining in A.
existing synonym replacement approaches can gen-
erally only attack tokens in a predefined vocabu-
lary (Alzantot et al., 2018; Jin et al., 2020; Ren
et al., 2019, inter alia). Second, as we will show in
the experiments (§3.3), contextualized infilling pro-
duces more fluent and grammatical outputs com-
pared to the context-agnostic counterparts, espe-
cially when using masked language models trained
on large-scale data. In addition, by using Merge
and Insert actions, CLARE can produce adversar-
ial examples whose lengths are different from the
inputs.
Generating adversarial examples with masked
language models is also explored by a concurrent
work (Li et al., 2020). Their method is similar to a
CLARE model except that it only uses the Replace
action. As shown in our ablation study (§4.1), using
all three actions helps CLARE achieve a better
attack performance.
3 Experiments
We evaluate CLARE on text classification, natural
language inference, and sentence paraphrase tasks.
We begin by describing the implementation details
of CLARE and the baselines (§3.1). §3.2 introduces
the datasets we experiment with and the evaluation
metrics; the results are summarized in §3.3.
3.1 Setup
• We experiment with a distilled version of
RoBERTa (RoBERTadistill; Sanh et al., 2019)
as the masked language model for contextual-
ized infilling. We also compare to base sized
RoBERTa (RoBERTabase; Liu et al., 2019) and
base sized BERT (BERTbase; Devlin et al.,
2019) in the ablation study (§4.1).
• The similarity function builds on the universal
sentence encoder (USE; Cer et al., 2018).
• The victim model is an MLP classifier on top
of BERTbase. It takes as input the first token’s
contextualized representation. We finetune
BERT when training the victim model.
• Merge perturbation can only merge noun
phrases, extracted with the NLTK toolkit.6
We find that this helps produce more gram-
matical outputs.
Baselines. We compare CLARE with recent
state-of-the-art word-level black-box adversarial
attack models, including:
6https://www.nltk.org/
Dataset Avg. Length # Classes Train Test Acc
Yelp 130 2 560K 38K 95.9%
AG News 46 4 120K 7.6K 95.0%
MNLI7 23/11 3 392K 9.8K 84.3%
QNLI 11/31 2 105K 5.4K 91.4%
Table 1: Some statistics of datasets. The last column
indicates the victim model’s accuracy on the original
test set without adversarial attack.
• PWWS: a recent model by Ren et al. (2019).
Based on word saliency (Li et al., 2016), it
greedily replaces tokens with their synonyms
from WordNet (Miller, 1995).
• TextFooler: a state-of-the-art model by Jin
et al. (2020). This replaces tokens with their
synonyms derived from counter-fitting word
embeddings (Mrksˇic´ et al., 2016), and uses
the same text similarity function as our work.
• TextFooler+LM: an improved variant of
TextFooler we implemented based on Alzan-
tot et al. (2018) and Cheng et al. (2019). This
inherits token replacement from TextFooler,
but uses an additional small sized GPT-2 lan-
guage model (Radford et al., 2019) to filter
out those candidate tokens that do not fit in
the context with calculated perplexity.
We use the open source implementation of the
above baselines provided by the authors. More
details are included in Appendix §A.1.
3.2 Datasets and Evaluation
Datasets. We evaluate CLARE with the follow-
ing datasets:
• Yelp Reviews (Zhang et al., 2015): a bi-
nary sentiment classification dataset based on
restaurant reviews.
• AG News (Zhang et al., 2015): a collection
of news articles with four categories: World,
Sports, Business and Science & Technology.
• MNLI (Williams et al., 2018): a natural lan-
guage inference dataset. Each instance con-
sists of a premise-hypothesis pair, and the
model is supposed to determine the relation
between them from a label set of entailment,
neutral, and contradiction. It covers text from
a variety of domains.
• QNLI (Wang et al., 2019a): a binary classi-
fication dataset converted from the Stanford
7We only examine the performance on the matched set,
since the mismatched set is easier to attack.
Yelp (PPL = 51.5) AG News (PPL = 62.8)
Model A-rate↑ Mod↓ PPL↓ GErr↓ Sim↑ A-rate↑ Mod↓ PPL↓ GErr↓ Sim↑
PWWS 35.3 8.2 98.8 0.33 0.64 14.2 7.9 114.8 0.56 0.71
TextFooler 77.0 16.6 163.3 1.23 0.70 56.1 23.3 331.3 1.43 0.69
+ LM 34.0 17.4 90.0 1.21 0.73 23.1 21.9 144.6 1.07 0.74
CLARE 79.1 10.3 83.5 0.25 0.78 65.3 5.9 82.9 0.15 0.76
MNLI (PPL = 60.9) QNLI (PPL = 46.0)
Model A-rate↑ Mod↓ PPL↓ GErr↓ Sim↑ A-rate↑ Mod↓ PPL↓ GErr↓ Sim↑
PWWS 16.6 6.4 101.3 0.30 0.70 8.8 8.0 88.4 0.32 0.71
TextFooler 59.8 13.8 161.5 0.63 0.73 57.8 16.9 164.4 0.62 0.72
+ LM 32.3 12.4 91.9 0.50 0.77 29.2 17.3 85.0 0.42 0.75
CLARE 88.1 7.5 82.7 0.02 0.82 83.8 11.8 76.7 0.01 0.78
Table 2: Adversarial example generation performance in attack success rate (A-rate), modification rate (Mod),
perplexity (PPL), number of increased grammar errors (GErr), and textual similarity (Sim). The perplexity of
the original inputs is indicated in parentheses for each dataset. Bold font indicates the best performance for each
metric.
question answering dataset (Rajpurkar et al.,
2016). The task is to determine whether the
context contains the answer to a question. It is
mainly based on English Wikipedia articles.
Table 1 summarizes some statistics of the
datasets. In addition to the above four datasets, we
experiment with DBpedia ontology dataset (Zhang
et al., 2015), Stanford sentiment treebank (Socher
et al., 2013), Microsoft Research Paraphrase Cor-
pus (Dolan and Brockett, 2005), and Quora Ques-
tion Pairs from the GLUE benchmark. The results
on these datasets are summarized in Appendix A.2.
Following previous practice (Alzantot et al.,
2018), we tune CLARE on training data, and eval-
uate with 1,000 randomly sampled test instances
of lengths ≤ 100. In the sentence-pair tasks (e.g.,
MNLI, QNLI), we attack the longer sentence ex-
cluding the tokens that appear in both.
Evaluation metrics. We follow previous works
(Jin et al., 2020; Zang et al., 2020), and evaluate
the models with the following automatic metrics:
• Attack success rate (A-rate): the percentage
of adversarial examples that can successfully
attack the victim model.
• Modification rate (Mod): the percentage of
modified tokens. Each Replace or Insert ac-
tion accounts for one token modified; a Merge
action is considered modifying one token if
one of the two merged tokens is kept (e.g.,
merging bigram ab into a), and two otherwise
(e.g., merging bigram ab into c).
• Perplexity (PPL): a metric used to evaluate
the fluency of adversaries (Kann et al., 2018;
Zang et al., 2020). The perplexity is calculated
using small sized GPT-2 with a 50K-sized
vocabulary (Radford et al., 2019).
• Grammar error (GErr): the number of in-
creased grammatical errors in the successful
adversarial example, compared to the origi-
nal text. Following (Zang et al., 2020; Morris
et al., 2020), we calculate this by the Lan-
guageTool (Naber et al., 2003).8
• Textual similarity (Sim): the similarity be-
tween the input and its adversary. Following
(Jin et al., 2020; Morris et al., 2020), we calcu-
late this using the universal sentence encoder
(USE; Cer et al., 2018).
The last four metrics are averaged across those
adversarial examples that successfully attack the
victim model.
3.3 Results
Table 2 summarizes the results. Although PWWS
achieves the best modification rate on 3 out of the
4 datasets, it underperforms CLARE in terms of
other metrics. With a very limited set of synonym
candidates from WordNet, PWWS fails to attack a
BERT model on most of inputs. Using word em-
beddings to find synonyms, TextFooler achieves a
higher success rate, but tends to produce less gram-
matical and less natural outputs. Equipped with
a language model, TextFooler+LM does better in
terms of perplexity, yet this brings little grammat-
icality improvement and comes at a cost to attack
success rate. With contextualized perturbations,
8https://www.languagetool.org/
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Figure 2: Top: Attack success rate and textual similar-
ity trade-off curves (both higher the better). Bottom:
Attack success rate (higher is better) and perplexity
(lower is better) trade-off curve. The larger area under
the two curves indicates the better trade-off between
two metrics.
CLARE achieves the best performance on attack
success rate, perplexity, grammaticality and similar-
ity. For AG News, CLARE outperforms TextFooler
by 9% on success rate and by a huge 245 on per-
plexity, and cuts average number of grammatical
errors by 1.3. We observe similar trends on other
datasets.
Figure 2 compares trade-off curves between at-
tack success rate and textual similarity. For each
model, we tune the thresholds for constructing the
candidate token sets, and plot textual similarity
against attack success rate. CLARE strikes the best
balance, showing a clear advantage in achieving a
success rate with least similarity drop. We observe
similar trends for attack success rate and perplexity
trade off.
Human evaluation. We further conduct human
evaluation on the AG News dataset. We randomly
sample 300 instances which both CLARE and
TextFooler successfully attack. For each input, we
pair the adversarial examples from the two models,
and present them to crowd-sourced judges along
with the original input and the gold label. We ask
them which they prefer in terms of (1) having a
meaning that is closer to the original input (simi-
Metric CLARE Neutral TextFooler
Similarity 56.1±2.5 28.1 15.8±2.1
Fluency&Grammaticality 42.5±2.5 48.6 8.9±1.5
Label Consistency 68.0±2.4 - 70.1±2.5
Table 3: Human evaluation performance in percentage
on the AG News dataset. ± indicates confidence inter-
vals with a 95% confidence level.
larity), and (2) being more fluent and grammatical
(fluency and grammaticality). We also provide a
neutral option, for when the judges consider the
two indistinguishable. Additionally, we ask the
judges to annotate adversarial examples, and com-
pare their annotations against the gold labels (label
consistency). We collect 5 responses for each pair
on every evaluated aspect. Further details are pro-
vided in Appendix A.4.
As shown in Table 3, CLARE has a significant
advantage over TextFooler: in terms of similarity
56% responses prefer CLARE, while 16% prefer
TextFooler. The trend is similar for fluency & gram-
maticality (42% vs. 9%). On label consistency,
CLARE slightly underperforms TextFooler at 68%
with a 95% condidence interval (CI) (66%, 70%),
versus 70% with a 95% CI (68%, 73%). We at-
tribute this to an inherent overlap of some cate-
gories in the AG News dataset, e.g., Science &
Technology and Business, as evidenced by a 71%
label consistency for original inputs.
Closing this section, Table 8 compares the ad-
versarial examples generated by TextFooler and
CLARE. More samples can be found in Ap-
pendix A.5.
4 Analysis
This section first conducts an ablation study (§4.1).
We then explore CLARE’s potential to be used
to improve downstream models’ robustness and
accuracy in §4.2. In §4.3, we empirically observe
that CLARE tends to attack noun and noun phrases.
4.1 Ablation Study
We ablate each component of CLARE to study its
effectiveness. We evaluate on the 1,000 randomly
selected AG news instances (§3.2). The results are
summarized in Table 4.
We first investigate the performance of three per-
turbations when applied individually. Among three
editing strategies, using INSERTONLY achieves the
best performance, with REPLACEONLY coming
in a close second. MERGEONLY underperforms
Module A-rate↑ Mod↓ PPL↓ GErr↓ Sim↑
TextFooler 56.1 23.3 331.3 1.43 0.69
CLARE 65.3 5.9 82.3 0.15 0.76
REPLACEONLY 58.8 7.9 85.6 0.11 0.75
INSERTONLY 59.4 6.9 94.8 0.20 0.76
MERGEONLY 21.0 6.2 95.2 0.01 0.79
w/o sim > ` 70.0 5.4 80.9 0.11 0.72
w/o pMLM > k 89.5 5.1 194.1 0.94 0.64
Table 4: Ablation study results. “w/o sim > `” ab-
lates the textual similarity constraint when constructing
the candidate sets, while “w/o pMLM > k” ablates the
masked language model probability constraint.
MLM A-rate↑ Mod↓ PPL↓ GErr↓ Sim↑
RoBERTadistill 65.3 5.9 82.3 0.15 0.76
RoBERTabase 64.9 5.8 81.3 0.11 0.76
BERTbase 63.9 6.4 95.7 0.96 0.74
Table 5: Results of CLARE implemented with different
masked language models (MLM).
the other two, partly due to that the attacks are re-
stricted to bigram noun phrases (§3.1). Combining
all three perturbations, CLARE achieves the best
performance with the least modifications.
To examine the effect of contextualized infilling,
we compare REPLACEONLY against TextFooler,
a context-agnostic model based on token replace-
ment. REPLACEONLY outperforms TextFooler
across the board, suggesting that contextualized
infilling helps generate better adversarial examples.
We now turn to the two constraints imposed
when constructing the candidate token set. Per-
haps not surprisingly, ablating the textual similarity
constraint (w/o sim) decreases the textual similar-
ity performance, but increases others. Ablating
the masked language model yields a better success
rate, but much worse perplexity, grammaticality,
and textual similarity.
Finally, we compare CLARE implemented with
different masked language models. Table 5 sum-
marizes the results. Overall, distilled RoBERTa
performs the best, and BERT underperforms the
others. Since the victim model is based on BERT,
we conjecture that it is less efficient to attack a
model using its own information.
4.2 Adversarial Training
This section explores CLARE’s potential in improv-
ing downstream models’ accuracy and robustness.
Following the adversarial training setup (Tsipras
et al., 2018), we use CLARE to generate adversarial
examples for AG news training instances, and in-
clude them as additional training data. We consider
two settings: training with (1) full training data
and full adversarial data and (2) 10% randomly-
sampled training data and its adversarial data, to
simulate the low-resource scenario. For both set-
tings, we compare a BERT-based MLP classifier
and a TextCNN (Kim, 2014) classifier without any
pretrained embedding.
We first examine whether adversarial examples,
as data augmentation, can help achieve better test
accuracy. As shown in Table 6, when the full train-
ing data is available, adversarial training slightly de-
creases the test accuracy by 0.2% and 0.4% respec-
tively. This aligns with previous observations (Jia
et al., 2019). When less training data is available,
the BERT-based classifier has a similar accuracy
drop. Interestingly, under the low-data scenario,
TextCNN with adversarial training achieves better
accuracy, with a 1.4% absolute improvement. This
suggests that a model with less capacity can benefit
more from silver data.
Does adversarial training help the models defend
against adversarial attacks? To evaluate this, we use
CLARE to attack the classifiers trained with and
without adversarial examples.9 A higher success
rate and fewer modifications indicate a victim clas-
sifier is more vulnerable to adversarial attacks. As
shown in Table 6, in 3 out of the 4 cases, adversar-
ial training helps to decrease the attack success rate
by more than 10.2%, and to increase the number of
modifications needed by more than 0.7. The only
exception is the TextCNN model trained with 10%
data. A possible reason could be that it is trained
with few data and thus generalizes less well.
These results suggest that CLARE can be used
to improve downstream models’ robustness, with a
negligible accuracy drop.
4.3 Perturbations by Part-of-speech Tags
In this section, we break down the adversarial at-
tacks by part-of-speech (POS) tags. We find that
most of the adversarial attacks happen to nouns or
noun phrases. As shown in Table 7, 64% of the
Replace actions are applied to nouns. Insert ac-
tions tend to insert tokens into noun phrase bigram:
two of the most frequent POS bigrams are noun
phrases. In fact, around 48% of the Insert actions
9 In preliminary experiments, we found that it is more
difficult to use other models to attack a victim model trained
with the adversarial examples generated by CLARE, than to
use CLARE itself.
Victim Model Acc A-rate Mod
BERT (100% data) 95.0 65.3 5.9
+ 100% adversarial -0.2 -23.4 +2.7
TextCNN (100% data) 91.2 93.8 6.5
+ 100% adversarial -0.4 -10.2 +0.7
BERT (10% data) 92.5 84.0 5.4
+ 10% adversarial -0.2 -14.4 +1.6
TextCNN (10% data) 83.6 97.3 6.2
+ 10% adversarial +1.4 -3.7 +0.3
Table 6: Adversarial training results on AG news test
set. “Acc” indicates accuracy.
Replace Insert Merge
NOUN: 64%
ADJ: 17%
VERB: 7%
(NOUN, NOUN): 12%
(ADJ, NOUN): 10%
(NOUN, VERB): 9%
ADJ-NOUN: 31%
NOUN-NOUN: 22%
DT-NOUN: 12%
Context: ... Amit Yoran, the government’s cybersecurity
chief, abruptly resigned yesterday after a year ...
Replace: cybersecurity← {security, surveillance, cryptogra-
phy, intelligence, encryption ...}
Insert: cybersecurity chief← {technology, defense, in-
telligence, program, project ...}
Merge: cybersecurity chief← {chief, consultant, administra-
tor, scientist, secretary ...}
Table 7: Top: Top-3 POS tags (or POS tag bigrams)
and their percentages for each perturbation type. (a, b):
insert a token between a and b. a-b: merge a and b into
a token. Bottom: An AG news sample, where CLARE
perturbs token “cybersecurity.” Neither PWWS nor
TextFooler is able to attack this token since it is out
of their vocabularies.
are applied to noun phrases. This also justifies our
choice of only applying Merge to noun phrases.
5 Related Work
Textual adversarial attack. An increasing
amount of effort is being devoted to generating
better textual adversarial examples with various at-
tack models. Character-based models (Liang et al.,
2019; Ebrahimi et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018; Gao
et al., 2018, inter alia) use misspellings to attack
the victim systems; however, these attacks can of-
ten be defended by a spell checker (Pruthi et al.,
2019; Vijayaraghavan and Roy, 2019; Zhou et al.,
2019b; Jones et al., 2020). Many sentence-level
models (Iyyer et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2019b; Zou
et al., 2020, inter alia) have been developed to intro-
duce more sophisticated token/phrase perturbations.
These, however, generally have difficulty maintain-
ing semantic similarity with original inputs (Zhang
et al., 2020a). Recent word-level models explore
AG
(Sci&Tech)
Sprint Corp. is in talks with Qualcomm Inc.
about using a network the chipmaker is building
to deliver live television to Sprint mobile phone
customers.
TextFooler
(Business)
Sprint Corps. is in talks with Qualcomm Inc.
about operated a network the chipmaker is con-
solidation to doing viva television to Sprint mo-
bile phone customers.
CLARE
(Business)
Sprint Corp. is in talks with Qualcomm Inc.
about using a network Qualcomm is building to
deliver cable television to Sprint mobile phone
customers.
MNLI
(Neutral)
Premise: Let me try it. She began snapping her
fingers and saying the word eagerly, but nothing
happened.
Hypothesis: She became frustrated when the
spell didn’t work.
TextFooler
(Contra-
diction)
Premise: Authorisation me attempting it. She
triggered flapping her pinkies and said the word
eagerly, but nothing arisen.
Hypothesis: She became frustrated when the
spell didn’t work.
CLARE
(Contra-
diction)
Premise: Let me try it. She began snapping her
fingers and saying the word eagerly, but nothing
unexpected happened.
Hypothesis: She became frustrated when the
spell didn’t work.
Table 8: Adversarial examples produced by different
models. The gold label of the original is shown below
the (bolded) dataset name. Replace, Insert and Merge
are highlighted in italic red, bold blue and sans serif
yellow, respectively. (Best viewed in color).
synonym substitution rules to enhance semantic
meaning preservation (Alzantot et al., 2018; Jin
et al., 2020; Ren et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019;
Zang et al., 2020, inter alia). Our work differs
in that CLARE uses three contextualized perturba-
tions that can produce more fluent and grammatical
outputs.
Text generation with BERT. Generation with
masked language models has been widely studied
in various natural language tasks, ranging from
lexical substitution (Wu et al., 2019a; Zhou et al.,
2019a; Qiang et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2019b, inter
alia) to non-autoregressive generation (Gu et al.,
2018; Lee et al., 2018; Ghazvininejad et al., 2019;
Ma et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2020;
Zhang et al., 2020b, inter alia). However, little
work has explored using these models to generate
adversarial examples for text.
6 Conclusion
We have presented CLARE, a contextualized ad-
versarial example generation model for text. It
uses contextualized knowledge from pretrained
masked language models, and can generate ad-
versarial examples that are natural, fluent and
grammatical. With three contextualized perturba-
tion patterns, Replace, Insert and Merge in our
arsenal, CLARE can produce outputs of varied
lengths and achieves a higher attack success rate
than baselines and with fewer edits. Human eval-
uation shows significant advantages of CLARE
in terms of textual similarity, fluency and gram-
maticality. We release our code and models at
https://github.com/cookielee77/CLARE.
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional Experiment Details
Model Implementation. All pretrained mod-
els and victim models based on RoBERTa and
BERTbase are implemented with Hugging Face
transformers10 (Wolf et al., 2019) based on Py-
Torch (Paszke et al., 2019). RoBERTadistill,
RoBERTabase and uncase BERTbase models have
82M, 125M and 110M parameters, respectively.
We use RoBERTadistill as our main backbone for
fast inference purpose. PWWS11 and TextFooler12
are built with their open source implementation
provided by the authors. In the implementation
of TextFooler+LM, we use small sized GPT-2 lan-
guage model (Radford et al., 2019) to further select
those candidate tokens that have top 20% perplexity
in the candidate token set. In the adversarial train-
ing (§4.2), the small TextCNN victim model (Kim,
2014) has 128 embedding size and 100 filters for
3, 4, 5 window size with 0.5 dropout, resulting in
7M parameters.
During the implementation of w/o pMLM > k in
the ablation study (§4.1), we randomly sample 200
tokens and then apply the similarity constraint to
construct candidate set, as exhausting the vocabu-
lary is computationally expensive.
Evaluation Metric. The similarity function sim
builds on the universal sentence encoder (USE; Cer
et al., 2018) to measure a local similarity at the per-
turbation position with window size 15 between the
original input and its adversary. All baselines are
equipped this sim when constructing the candidate
vocabulary. The evaluation metric Sim uses USE
to calculate a global similarity between two texts.
These procedures are typically following Jin et al.
(2020). We mostly rely on human evaluation (§3.3)
to conclude the significant advantage of preserv-
ing textual similarity on CLARE compared with
TextFooler.
Data Processing. When processing the data, we
keep all punctuation in texts for both victim
model training and attacking. Since GLUE bench-
mark (Wang et al., 2019a) does not provide the
label for test set, we instead use its dev set as
the the test set for the included datasets (MNLI,
QNLI, QQP, MRPC, SST-2) in the evaluation. For
10https://github.com/huggingface/
transformers
11https://github.com/JHL-HUST/PWWS/
12https://github.com/jind11/TextFooler
Dataset Avg. Length # Classes Train Test Acc
SST-2 10 2 67K 0.9K 92.3%
DBpedia 55 14 560K 70K 99.3%
QQP 13/13 2 363K 40K 91.4%
MRPC 23/23 2 3.6K 1.7K 81.4%
Table 9: Some statistics of datasets. The last column
indicates the victim model’s accuracy on the original
test set without adversarial attack.
the sentence-pair tasks (e.g., MNLI, QNLI, QQP,
MRPC), we attack the longer one excluding the to-
kens appearing in both sentences. This is because
inference tasks usually require entailed data to have
the same keywords, e.g., numbers, name entities,
etc. All experiments are conducted on one Nvidia
GTX 1080Ti GPU.
A.2 Additional Results
We include the results of DBpedia ontology dataset
(DBpedia; Zhang et al., 2015, Stanford sentiment
treebank (SST-2; Socher et al., 2013), Microsoft
Research Paraphrase Corpus (MRPC; Dolan and
Brockett, 2005), and Quora Question Pairs (QQP)
from the GLUE benchmark in this section. Table 9
summarizes come statistics of these datasets. The
results of different models on these datasets are
summarized Table 10. Compared with all base-
lines, CLARE achieves the best performance on
attack success rate, perplexity, grammaticality, and
similarity. It is consistent with our observation in
§3.3.
A.3 Running Time
We conduct speed experiment with one Nvidia
GTX 1080Ti GPU in Table 11. By searching
more possible perturbation actions and constructing
the contextualized candidate vocabulary, CLARE
achieves better performance on attack success and
modification rate with a cost of inference speed
(0.11 vs 0.39 sample/s).
A.4 Human Evaluation Details
For each human evaluation on AG News dataset,
we randomly sampled 300 sentences from the test
set combining the corresponding adversarial exam-
ples from CLARE and TextFooler (We only con-
sider sentences can be attacked by both models).
In order to make the task less abstract, we pair
the adversarial examples by the two models, and
present them to the participants along with the orig-
inal input and its gold label. We ask them which
SST-2 (PPL = 99.5) DBpedia (PPL = 37.3)
Model A-rate↑ Mod↓ PPL↓ GErr↓ Sim↑ A-rate↑ Mod↓ PPL↓ GErr↓ Sim↑
PWWS 31.4 9.93 168.3 0.31 0.62 7.6 8.3 57.6 0.54 0.68
TextFooler 89.8 14.9 227.7 0.53 0.69 56.2 24.9 182.5 1.88 0.68
+ LM 51.7 18.3 137.5 0.50 0.69 20.1 22.4 84.0 1.22 0.70
CLARE 97.8 7.5 137.4 0.01 0.75 65.8 7.02 53.3 -0.03 0.73
QQP (PPL = 56.2) MRPC (PPL = 42.9)
Model A-rate↑ Mod↓ PPL↓ GErr↓ Sim↑ A-rate↑ Mod↓ PPL↓ GErr↓ Sim↑
PWWS 6.0 7.8 86.5 0.31 0.69 5.8 6.5 82.6 0.31 0.68
TextFooler 16.2 12.7 145.2 0.61 0.74 24.5 10.6 118.8 0.35 0.75
+ LM 7.8 12.9 78.8 0.21 0.77 12.9 9.5 71.0 0.29 0.79
CLARE 27.7 10.2 74.8 0.14 0.76 34.8 9.1 69.5 0.02 0.83
Table 10: Adversarial example generation performance in attack success rate (A-rate), modification rate (Mod),
perplexity (PPL), number of increased grammar errors (GErr), and text similarity (Sim). The perplexity of the
original inputs is indicated in parentheses for each dataset. Bold indicates the best performance on each metric.
Model A-rate (%) Mod (%) Speed (sample/s)
TextFooler 56.1 23.3 0.39
CLARE 65.3 5.9 0.11
Table 11: Speed experiment with different attack mod-
els.
one they prefer in terms of (1) having more similar
a meaning to the original input (similarity), and (2)
being more fluent and grammatical (fluency and
grammaticality). We also provide them with a neu-
tral option, when the participants consider the two
indistinguishable. Additionally, we ask the partic-
ipants to annotate the adversarial examples, and
compare their annotations against the gold labels
(label consistency). Higher label consistency in-
dicates the model is better at causing the victim
model to make errors while preserving human pre-
dictions.
Each pair of system outputs was randomly pre-
sented to 5 crowd-sourced judges, who indicated
their preference for similarity, fluency, and gram-
maticality using the form shown in Figure 3. The
labelling task is illustrated in Figure 4. To minimize
the impact of spamming, we employed the top-
ranked 30% of U.S. workers provided by the crowd-
sourcing service. Detailed task descriptions and
examples were also provided to guide the judges.
We calculate p-value based on 95% confidence in-
tervals by using 10K paired bootstrap replications,
implemented using the R Boot statistical package.
A.5 Qualitative Samples
We include generated adversarial examples by
CLARE and TextFooler on AG News, DBpeida,
Yelp, MNLI, and QNLI datasets in Table 12 and
Table 13.
AG
(Business)
TECH BUZZ : Yahoo, Adobe team up for new Web services. Stepping up the battle of online search and services,
Yahoo Inc. and Adobe Systems Inc. have joined forces to tap each other’s customers and put Web search features
into Adobe’s popular Acrobat Reader software.
TextFooler
(Sci&Tech)
TECH BUZZ : Yahoo, Adobe team up for roman Cyberspace utilities. Stepping up the battle of online locating and
services, Yahoo Inc. and Adobe Systems Inc. have joined forces to tap each other’s customers and put Web search
features into Adobe’s popular Acrobat Reader software.
CLARE
(Sci&Tech)
TECH BUZZ : Yahoo, Adobe team up for new Web Explorer. Stepping up the battle of online search and services,
Yahoo Inc. and Adobe Systems Inc. have joined forces to tap each other’s customers and put Web search features
into Adobe’s popular Acrobat Reader software.
AG
(Sport)
Padres Blank Dodgers 3 - 0. LOS ANGELES - Adam Eaton allowed five hits over seven innings for his career -
high 10th victory, Brian Giles homered for the second straight game, and the San Diego Padres beat the Los Angeles
Dodgers 3 - 0 Thursday night. The NL West - leading Dodgers’ lead was cut to 2 1 / 2 games over San Francisco -
their smallest since July 31 ...
TextFooler
(World)
Dodger Blank Yanks 3 - 0. Loos ANGELES - Adams Parades enabling five hits over seven slugging for his career -
high 10th victoria, Brian Giles homered for the second straight matching, and the Tome Jos Dodger beat the Los
Angeles Dodger 3 - 0 Thursday blackness. The NL Westerner - eminent Dodger’ lead was cut to 2 1 / 2 games over
San San - their tiny as janvier 31 ...
CLARE
(World)
Padres Blank Dodgers 3 - 0. Milwaukee NEXT - Adam Eaton allowed five hits over seven innings for his career -
high 10th victory, Brian Giles homered for the second straight game, and the San Diego Padres beat the Los Angeles
Dodgers 3 - 0 Thursday night. The NL West - leading Dodgers’ lead was cut to 2 1 / 2 games over San Francisco -
their smallest since July 31 ...
Yelp
(Positive)
The food at this chain has always been consistently good. Our server in downtown ( where we spent New Year’s )
was new, but that did not impact our service at all. She was prompt and attentive to our needs.
TextFooler
(Negative)
The food at this chain has always been necessarily ok. Our server in downtown ( where we spent New Year’s ) was
new, but that did not impact our service at all. She was early and attentive to our needs.
CLARE
(Negative)
The food at this chain has always been looking consistently good. Our server in downtown ( where we spent New
Year’s ) was new, but that did not enhance our service at all. She was prompt and attentive to our needs.
Yelp
(Positive)
The pho broth is actually flavorful and doesn’t just taste like hot water with beef and noodles. I usually do take out
and the order comes out fast during dinner which should be expected with pho, it’s not hard to soak noodles, slice
beef and pour broth.
TextFooler
(Negative)
The pho broth is actually flavorful and doesn’t just tasty like torrid waters with slaughter and salads. I repeatedly
do take out and the order poses out fast during dinner which should be expected with pho , it’s not strenuous to soak
noodles, severing beef and pour broth.
CLARE
(Negative)
The pho broth is actually flavorful and doesn’t just taste bland like hot water with beef and noodles. I usually do
take out and the order comes out awfully fast during dinner which should be expected with pho, it’s not hard to
soak noodles, slice beef and pour broth.
MNLI
(Neutral)
Premise: Thebes held onto power until the 12th Dynasty, when its first king, Amenemhet Iwho reigned between
1980 1951 b.c. established a capital near Memphis.
Hypothesis: The capital near Memphis lasted only half a century before its inhabitants abandoned it for the next
capital.
TextFooler
(Contradiction)
Premise: Thebes apprehended pour powers until the 12th Familial , when its earliest king , Amenemhet Iwho
reigned between 1980 1951 c.c. established a capital near Memphis .
Hypothesis: The capital near Memphis lasted only half a century before its inhabitants abandoned it for the next
capital.
CLARE
(Contradiction)
Premise: Thebes held onto power until the 12th Dynasty, when its first king, Amenemhet Iwho reigned between
1980 1951 b.c. thereafter established a capital near Memphis.
Hypothesis: The capital near Memphis lasted only half a century before its inhabitants abandoned it for the next
capital.
MNLI
(Entailment)
Premise: Hopefully, Wall Street will take voluntary steps to address these issues before it is forced to act.
Hypothesis: Wall Street is facing issues, that need to be addressed.
TextFooler
(Neutral)
Premise: Hopefully, Wall Street will take voluntary steps to treatment these issues before it is forced to act.
Hypothesis: Wall Street is facing issues, that need to be addressed.
CLARE
(Neutral)
Premise: Hopefully, Wall Street will take voluntary steps to eliminate these issues before it is forced to act.
Hypothesis: Wall Street is facing issues, that need to be addressed.
Table 12: Adversarial examples produced by different models. The gold label of the original is shown below the
(bolded) dataset name. Replace, Insert and Merge are highlighted in italic red, bold blue and sans serif yellow,
respectively. (Best viewed in color).
QNLI
(Entailment)
Premise: Who overturned the Taft Vale judgement ?
Hypothesis: One of the first acts of the new Liberal Government was to reverse the Taff Vale judgement.
TextFooler
(Not-
Entailment)
Premise: Who overturned the Taft Vale judgement ?
Hypothesis: One of the first acts of the new Liberal Government was to invest the Taff Vale judgement.
CLARE
(Not-
Entailment)
Premise: Who overturned the Taft Vale judgement ?
Hypothesis: One of the first acts of the new Liberal Constitution was to reverse the Taff Vale judgement.
QNLI
(Entailment)
Premise: What are the software testers aware of ?
Hypothesis: Black-box testing treats the software as a black box, examining functionality without any knowledge of
internal implementation, without seeing the source code.
TextFooler
(Not-
Entailment)
Premise: What are the software testers aware of ?
Hypothesis: Black-boxes testing administers the software as a black box, investigating functions unless any
knowledge of internal fulfil, unless seeing the wellspring code.
CLARE
(Not-
Entailment)
Premise: What are the software testers aware of ?
Hypothesis: Black-box testing treats the software as a black box, examining functionality without awareness of
internal implementation, without seeing the source code.
DBpedia
(Transportation)
Honda Crossroad. The Honda Crossroad refers to two specific types of SUVs made by Honda. One of them is a
rebadged Land Rover Discovery Series I SUV while the other is a completely different vehicle introduced in 2008.
TextFooler
(Album)
Suzuki Junctions. The Suzuki Crossroad refers to three accurate typing of prius posed byIsuzu. One of them is a
rebadged Land Rover Identify Series I LEXUS while the other is a completely different vehicle introduced in 2008.
CLARE
(Company)
Honda Crossroad. The Honda Crossroad refers to two specific manufacturers of SUVs made by Honda. One of
them is a rebadged Land Rover Discovery Series I SUV while the other is a completely different vehicle introduced
in 2008.
DBpedia
(Company)
Yellow Rat Bastard. Yellow Rat Bastard is the flagship establishment in a chain of New York City retail clothing
stores owned by Henry Ishay. It specializes in hip - hop-and alternative - style clothing and shoes.
TextFooler
(Building)
Yellowish Rats Schmuck . Yellowish Rats Dickwad is the flagship establishments in a chains of New York City retail
uniforms stores owned by Henrik Ishay . It specialize in hip - hop-and alternative - style laundry and sneakers.
CLARE
(Building)
Yellow Rat Bastard. Yellow Rat Bastard Mall is the flagship establishment in a chain of New York City retail
clothing stores owned by Henry Ishay. It specializes in hip - hop-and alternative - style clothing and shoes.
MRPC
(Not
Paraphrase)
Premise: The Americas market will decline 2.1 percent to $30.6 billion in 2003, and then grow 15.7 percent to
$35.4 billion in 2004.
Hypothesis: The US chip market is expected to decline 2.1 percent this year, then grow 15.7 percent in 2004.
TextFooler
(Paraphrase)
Premise: The Americas market will decline 2.1 percent to $30.6 billion in 2003, and then grow 15.7 percent to
$35.4 billion in 2004.
Hypothesis: The US chip market is prescribed to decline 2.1 percent this year, then grow 15.7 percent in 2004.
CLARE
(Paraphrase)
Premise: The Americas market will decline 2.1 percent to $30.6 billion in 2003, and then grow 15.7 percent to
$35.4 billion in 2004.
Hypothesis: The US chip market is expected to decline 2.1 percent this year, then grow 15.7 percent in 2004 yr.
MRPC
(Paraphrase)
Premise: The Securities and Exchange Commission filed a civil fraud suit against the teen in Boston.
Hypothesis: The Securities and Exchange Commission brought a related civil case on Thursday.
TextFooler
(Not
Paraphrase)
Premise: The Securities and Exchange Commission filed a civil fraud suit against the teen in Boston.
Hypothesis: The Securities and Exchange Commission brought a connect civil case on Yesterday.
CLARE
(Not
Paraphrase)
Premise: The Securities and Exchange Commission filed a civil fraud suit against the teen in Boston.
Hypothesis: The Securities and Exchange Commission brought a Massachusetts civil lawsuit on Thursday.
Table 13: Adversarial examples produced by different models. The gold label of the original is shown below the
(bolded) dataset name. Replace, Insert and Merge are highlighted in italic red, bold blue and sans serif yellow,
respectively. (Best viewed in color).
Figure 3: Pair-wise comparison in terms of text similarity and fluency & grammaticality on human evaluation.
Figure 4: Label consistency task on human evaluation.
